Molecules of Optionality

Why Europe's Pipeline Transition Is a Capital-Allocation Problem, Not an Engineering One

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Abstract

Europe's decarbonisation debate has misfiled its midstream infrastructure. The prevailing framing treats the continent's oil and gas pipelines as stranded assets, liabilities to be written down as fossil demand declines, while a competing techno-optimist camp insists they can be straightforwardly converted to carry hydrogen. Both are arguing about the wrong object. The steel in the ground is the least durable and least valuable part of a pipeline system. The scarce, effectively un-reproducible asset is the corridor: the rights-of-way, easements, interconnection points, coastal terminals, and operating organisations assembled over half a century through a permitting and social-licence process that could not be repeated today at any price.

This paper argues that the strategic question facing a midstream operator is not *can this pipe carry a different molecule* (an engineering question that is, for most purposes, already resolved) but *how should the option value of an irreplaceable corridor be allocated under deep and irreducible uncertainty about which energy future arrives*. That is a capital-allocation problem, and it belongs to the discipline of portfolio strategy and real options, not to metallurgy.

Using a major trans-continental crude-oil corridor as an illustrative archetype, the paper develops a decision framework spanning four molecular futures — residual crude, drop-in renewable liquids, reverse-flow CO_2 transport, and orderly reserve — and demonstrates that the binding constraint on each is demand risk rather than technical feasibility: whether anyone will commit, at tenor, to paying for the new molecule. Public balance sheets now underwrite that risk at scale, through auctioned premiums, intermediated offtake, state-backstopped amortisation accounts, and regulated transport-and-storage models. Yet every such instrument stops at a national border. The unsolved problem, and the corridor operator's defining task, is instrument-stacking: assembling national de-risking schemes into a single bankable cross-border structure. The paper further argues that the corridor's value is not even bounded by molecules: the same right-of-way that carries hydrocarbons can carry data, positioning legacy energy infrastructure as a candidate contribution to Europe's digital resilience. The conclusion is a framework for deciding, asset by asset, which corridors to convert, which to reserve, and which to retire. Mispricing that decision, in either direction, is among the more consequential capital-allocation errors of the coming decade.

1. The Paradox of the Recent Expansion

Not long ago, one of Europe's most strategically important crude-oil arteries completed a major capacity expansion. The stated purpose was unambiguous and, by the standards of the moment, unarguable: to allow a landlocked economy to reduce its dependence on a politically exposed overland supply route by re-routing crude through a southern deep-water port and across a major mountain barrier. In the aftermath of a continental energy shock, this was infrastructure doing exactly what strategic infrastructure is supposed to do. It bought security, diversified dependency, and insulated an economy from a single vulnerable supplier.

And yet the same expansion arrived at the precise moment the European Union had codified climate neutrality by 2050 into binding policy, a trajectory that requires oil consumption across the bloc to fall substantially within the operating lifetime of the very pumps being installed. Civil-society groups moved quickly to frame such expansions as fossil lock-in incompatible with the continent's own decarbonisation commitments.

The paradox sits in a single asset. At the same moment, the corridor became more strategically vital and more structurally stranded; it is indispensable for energy security and, on the prevailing climate logic, obsolescent. Both statements are true. The tension between them is not a contradiction to be resolved by choosing a side. It is the defining strategic condition of nearly every major energy corridor in Europe, and the vocabulary we bring to it, “stranded assets” and “fossil lock-in”, is too blunt to guide a single real capital decision. This paper argues for a sharper vocabulary, and for a different way of seeing what these assets actually are.

2. The Asset Misdefined: Corridor, Not Cargo

The debate over pipeline repurposing fixates almost entirely on the pipe: can the steel tolerate a new molecule? For hydrogen, the discussion turns on embrittlement; for CO_2, on corrosion and phase behaviour. This is a real engineering conversation, but it obscures a more important truth. The steel is the least durable and least valuable component of a pipeline system. It can be re-lined, re-rated, or in the limit re-laid within an existing trench. It is replaceable.

What is not replaceable — what took half a century to assemble and could not be recreated today at any price — is the corridor itself: the continuous right-of-way and its easements; the interconnection points to refineries, terminals, and adjacent networks; the deep-water port and tank farms at its head; the operating organisations, control systems, and safety culture; and, underpinning all of it, the social and political licence to route hazardous infrastructure through hundreds of kilometres of populated and protected landscape. No operator could obtain those permissions afresh in the timeframe of the energy transition. That, and not the tonnage of steel, is the asset (Exhibit 1).

EXHIBIT 1

The pipe is replaceable; the corridor is not



Source: author's analysis.

Reframing the object reframes the strategy. "Stranded asset" implies a liability to be minimised, but a scarce, effectively un-reproducible corridor facing an uncertain molecular future is better described as a mispriced option. The two dominant narratives, write it off or convert it trivially, are symmetrical errors: one prices the option at zero, the other prices it as already exercised. Both misstate what the holder actually owns, which is the right, but not the obligation, to deploy an irreplaceable corridor across a range of possible futures.

3. Four Molecular Futures

If the corridor is the constant, the cargo is the variable. For a crude-oil corridor, four molecular futures define the option set. They are not mutually exclusive, and the art lies in sequencing across them rather than betting on one (Exhibit 2).

EXHIBIT 2

Four futures, one option set



Source: author's analysis; underlying figures per Appendix A.

Residual crude

The incumbent use, in structural decline. As oil demand peaks and falls, throughput declines. But security value can outlast economic value, keeping a strategically important line in service, and even expanding, well after a purely commercial logic would retire it. This is the base case, and the recent expansion described above is its clearest expression.

Drop-in renewable liquids

The highest-probability reuse, because it requires the least of everyone. Hydrotreated vegetable oil, synthetic e-fuels, and bio-crude are liquids that can move through existing infrastructure to the same refineries, refineries themselves under pressure to co-process renewable feedstocks. The corridor keeps its customers by changing its cargo. This is the liquid-fuel analogue of the gas sector's hydrogen conversion, and it inherits none of hydrogen's metallurgical difficulty.

Reverse-flow CO_2 transport

The boldest option, and the one that inverts the corridor's direction. Instead of crude flowing inland from the coast, dense-phase CO_2 captured at inland industrial clusters flows outward to the coastal terminal for shipping to offshore or sub-seabed storage, recasting a fossil-import corridor as a decarbonisation-export gateway. It is technically the hardest of the four (dense-phase CO_2 imposes real corrosion, water-content, and phase-management constraints) and carries the largest optionality if carbon capture scales.

Reserve and orderly retirement

The option no one frames as a strategy, but should. A staged, deliberate wind-down, whether mothballing with preserved reactivation capability or orderly decommissioning, has real value and is vastly preferable to a disorderly write-off. Treating retirement as a first-class option rather than a failure state is essential to allocating the other three sensibly.

As a public benchmark for the economics of molecular conversion, the European gas sector offers a useful comparison. Its flagship hydrogen-backbone plan envisages roughly 53,000 km by 2040, around 60% of it repurposed rather than newly built, at an estimated €80–143 billion (2022 estimate); pipeline transport is costed at roughly €0.11–0.21 per kilogram per 1,000 km. Repurposing, where feasible, is consistently a fraction of the cost of new build. The lesson transfers: the value is in reusing the corridor, not in the molecule per se.

4. The Corridor Beyond Molecules: The Digital Dividend

The deepest implication of the corridor-not-cargo reframing is that the corridor's value is not bounded by molecules at all. A right-of-way is indifferent to what travels within it. The same easement assembled for oil can host fibre-optic cable, and in doing so the corridor stops being an energy asset facing obsolescence and becomes a digital asset facing compounding demand.

Nor is the idea new; it has a four-decade record. In the United States, a pipeline company began threading fibre-optic cable through its decommissioned petroleum lines in 1985 and built the country's fourth-largest long-distance network before selling it for billions a decade later. Retired hydrocarbon steel became the literal conduit of a telecommunications business. Closer to the archetype, a peer pipeline in the same region has executed the modern version: fibre installed with the pipeline along roughly 880 kilometres of right-of-way was commercialised through a joint venture and complemented by a new subsea crossing, anchoring a 4,500-kilometre backbone that links a major western Mediterranean landing hub to the continent's south-eastern edge. Two details of that project put a number on the corridor premium. The network went from design to service in about twelve months, roughly half the usual time, because the wayleaves, access, and security regime already existed. And the pipeline's statutory protection zone gives the buried fibre, on the operator's own figures, roughly an eighth of the cut rate of cable laid under public roads. The model is proven at both ends of the asset lifecycle; the question is only whether a given corridor points at the right demand.

The macro trends favour this kind of asset. Authoritative forecasts put global network traffic growth at 22–25 per cent a year through 2030, driven by AI and cloud, with AI traffic between data centres among the fastest-growing segments. The industry is meanwhile seeking to diversify away from single chokepoints such as the Suez route, and treats Mediterranean and Adriatic alternatives as strategic. Established landing hubs remain dominant, but the geography is shifting toward routes that reach Central and Eastern European demand more directly. A corridor whose right-of-way already runs from a coastal landing point into the industrial heartland is pre-built backhaul for that traffic. And because pipelines are routed for directness, the same easement doubles as a low-latency route.

Cooling sharpens the case, and here the evidence has moved from concept to construction site. The AI build-out has turned data-centre freshwater consumption into a live constraint, increasingly in water-stressed inland hubs. On Europe's Atlantic coast, a 1.2-gigawatt data campus is rising around a subsea-cable landing at an industrial port, cooled by seawater drawn through the repurposed intake of a decommissioned coal-fired power station, with a design water-usage-effectiveness of zero. That project is this paper's thesis in miniature: legacy energy infrastructure at a coastal landing point, carrying digital value. A corridor whose head is a deep-water terminal can host the same configuration (cable landing plus first-hop compute, with waste heat to district use) and then carry the traffic onward along the existing easement.

The capital-allocation discipline, however, cuts against ambition here. A midstream operator has no business becoming a data-centre developer: the capabilities, the capital intensity, and the risk profile are all wrong, and a bet-the-company diversification is exactly the kind of irreversible commitment a real-options logic forbids. The corridor's natural position is rights-holder and landlord, contributing easement, installed fibre, landing site, and cooling access to ventures in which digital-infrastructure specialists carry the build and market risk. The regional precedent again supplies the template: the pipeline contributed corridor and fibre to a joint venture; a fibre operator built, lit, and runs the network. Small, reversible, partner-carried commitments, which is what the framework in Section 7 prescribes.

The constraints deserve equal weight. Co-locating telecommunications within a hazardous-liquid right-of-way is subject to serious safety and permitting review, and retrofitting fibre differs from designing it in from the outset, as the peer project did. A corridor that is not already a cable-landing hub competes with entrenched incumbents; its edge is the inland shortcut, not incumbency. Power at data-centre scale is a separate problem the right-of-way does not solve. In pure revenue terms, fibre leasing is ancillary against pipeline throughput. Its value is as molecule-neutral downside protection, strongest in the reserve-and-retire scenario, where, as the American precedent shows, it can become a standalone reason the corridor keeps earning after the hydrocarbons stop.

The recent expansion diversified a nation's oil supply away from a single vulnerable dependency; the identical corridor could help diversify Europe's data routes away from a single geographic chokepoint. No single asset delivers digital sovereignty. That is a policy outcome, not a property of an easement. Route diversity, though, is a contribution one easement demonstrably can make. Energy resilience and digital resilience, from the same strip of land.

5. The Binding Constraint: Who Underwrites the Demand Risk?

If the engineering is, for most purposes, solved (operators of gas networks consistently regard hydrogen embrittlement as manageable through pressure control and station retrofits, and liquid-fuel and fibre reuse are less demanding still), then technical feasibility is not the binding constraint. The binding constraint is demand risk: not whether the molecule can move, but whether anyone will commit, at tenor, to paying for its movement.

The deadlock has a precise financial anatomy. Corridor capital amortises over thirty to forty years; industrial off-takers will not contract at that tenor for a molecule whose cost trajectory they cannot see; lenders will not advance against merchant molecular demand. The conversion option is real, but it is not contractible between private parties. Where no one steps in, the corridor dies with the physics intact. The proof is on the public record. In 2024, a Norwegian energy major and a German utility abandoned their flagship cross-border hydrogen pipeline, a roughly €3 billion line anchoring a supply chain estimated in the tens of billions, stating that the investment could not proceed without long-term agreements and a market in place. The same year, a supermajor discontinued a CO_2 pipeline project in southern England on identical grounds: the policy and market conditions were not in place. In neither case was feasibility the question. The tenor was.

What the stranded-asset debate has not yet absorbed is that this deadlock has since been broken, repeatedly. Every solution, though, amounts to the same move: a public balance sheet writing an option that private counterparties cannot. Four instrument families now operate at scale, and each answers the question of *who holds the demand risk, and at what price* differently (Exhibit 3).

EXHIBIT 3

Who writes the option? Four instrument families, one move

Instrument family (public anchor)	Risk it moves off private books	The public position, in capital-markets terms	Scale to date
Production premium by auction *European Hydrogen Bank*	producer cost gap	ten-year fixed premium, priced competitively in public	**≈ €2.8 bn awarded across three rounds since 2023**
Intermediated offtake *H2Global*	tenor mismatch, supply vs demand	the state takes the term-structure position	**> €4 bn committed; first price €1,000/t**
Amortisation account + guarantee *German hydrogen core network*	ramp-up revenue shortfall	a thirty-year put on utilisation, with a 24% deductible	**€24 bn facility; 9,040 km network, ≈60% repurposed**
Regulated T&S + take-or-pay *UK clusters; Dutch & Norwegian CO_2*	merchant utilisation risk	a revenue floor of last resort	**£21.7 bn over 25 years; 15-year anchor contracts**

Source: author's analysis; underlying figures per Appendix A.

Production premiums by auction. The European Hydrogen Bank pays winning producers a fixed premium per kilogram for ten years, allocated by competitive tender; three rounds since 2023 have awarded roughly €2.8 billion across some thirty projects, with the pilot clearing at premiums of €0.37–0.48 per kilogram. The auction closes the producer's cost gap and, as valuably, prices it in public. It underwrites nothing on the offtake side, and the attrition shows as much: of fifteen second-round winners, only six proceeded to signature.

Intermediated offtake. Germany's H2Global mechanism inverts the problem. A state-funded intermediary signs ten-year purchase agreements upstream and sells short-term contracts downstream, absorbing the tenor mismatch on the public account; in capital-markets terms, the state takes the term-structure position the market refuses. Its pilot award put the first public price on the green premium: renewable ammonia delivered to Europe at €1,000 per tonne, against roughly half that for the conventional product. Germany has committed over €4 billion to the mechanism. Its failure mode is instructive too: a parallel e-fuels lot drew no winner because the contract's size and duration could not finance a plant. An option written at the wrong strike attracts no takers.

Intertemporal tariff socialisation with a state backstop. The purest real-options structure in the set is Germany's hydrogen core network: some 9,000 kilometres, roughly 60% of it repurposed gas pipe, financed through an amortisation account. Ramp-up tariffs are capped below cost recovery; the shortfall accumulates in a state-guaranteed account backed by a €24 billion development-bank facility, to be repaid by later users; and if the account is not balanced by 2055, the federal government absorbs the loss, with the network operators retaining a co-payment of up to 24 per cent. The ministry's own explanatory material describes the guarantee, without irony, as the solution to the chicken-and-egg problem. In plain terms, the state has written a thirty-year put on network utilisation, and the operators' retention is the deductible.

Regulated transport-and-storage models with aggregated take-or-pay. For CO_2, the United Kingdom has committed up to £21.7 billion over twenty-five years to its first two capture clusters, with the pipeline-and-store operator remunerated under an economic licence that provides government revenue support of last resort where user revenues fall short. The Dutch flagship reached financial close differently: a fully state-owned transport-and-storage venture aggregated four industrial emitters onto fifteen-year take-or-pay contracts (signed two years before the investment decision), with the emitters' capture economics underwritten in turn by the national carbon-abatement subsidy scheme, and the onshore pipeline deliberately oversized for customers that do not yet exist. The Norwegian model socialised the bulk of first-phase cost outright; injection began in 2025 under Europe's first cross-border CO_2 storage offering, with commercial volumes contracted from emitters in the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden.

Every one of these instruments stops at a border; even the EU-level auction underwrites production, not transport. That is the corridor's problem. A line crossing three jurisdictions faces three answers to whether residual gas-era book value may migrate into a new regulated asset base, three ramp-up tariff logics, three permitting regimes, and, for CO_2, three long-term liability frameworks plus bilateral arrangements under the London Protocol for any shipped volumes. The EU's 2024 hydrogen and gas market package softens the edges: it permits intertemporal cost allocation of the German type and, transitionally and under regulatory approval, financial transfers from gas-network users, while project-of-common-interest status accelerates permitting and unlocks European funding. But no instrument exists at corridor scale. The chicken-and-egg has been solved inside borders; it remains unsolved across them (Exhibit 4).

EXHIBIT 4

Solved inside borders, unsolved across them



Source: author's analysis; underlying figures per Appendix A.

This reframes the operator's task, and the paper's thesis with it. For a multi-jurisdiction corridor, the scarce capability is not metallurgy but instrument-stacking: sequencing national de-risking schemes into a single bankable cross-border structure — an auctioned premium here, a regulated amortisation account there, a subsidy-backed anchor off-taker at the far end. The corridor holder becomes, in effect, the system integrator of other people's balance sheets. The discipline cuts both ways. These instruments are young and leaky: award-to-signature attrition, slipped commissioning dates, lots that clear with no winner. After twenty years around infrastructure capital, my working rule is to treat every award as provisional until signature. And where no stack can be assembled along a given route, that is not a failure of imagination but a price; it raises the value of the reserve-and-retire option in the framework of Section 7. This is where repurposing lives or dies. The domain is governance and cross-border capital structuring, not metallurgy.

6. The Counter-Case

A framework that only its author can defend is worthless, so the strongest objections to corridor optionality are stated here without dilution.

- **Electrons may beat molecules.** For much of the energy system, direct electrification plus high-voltage transmission is more efficient than moving molecules at all. Where that holds, some corridors are genuinely redundant rather than repurposable, and optionality analysis should not disguise a stranded asset as a strategic one.
- **CO_2 reuse carries real, under-acknowledged risk.** Dense-phase CO_2 in a repurposed crude line raises corrosion, water-content, and phase-behaviour challenges, and imposes long-term stewardship liability for stored carbon that the optimistic case tends to gloss.

- **Renewable-liquid volumes may never fill the pipe.** If sustainable liquid-fuel supply scales slowly, a large-diameter trunk line may run at uneconomic utilisation regardless of technical readiness.
- **The option-writers can walk.** Every instrument in Section 5 is a policy, and policies are revocable. Germany's Constitutional Court struck €60 billion from the federal climate fund in November 2023, forcing an overnight renegotiation of the country's transition spending; subsidy regimes elsewhere have been trimmed, delayed, or contested after elections. A conversion case built on stacked national instruments inherits stacked sovereign counterparty risk. A framework that treats state-written puts as riskless is not pricing the option; it is flattering it.
- **Hydrogen has its own caveats.** Hydrogen is an indirect greenhouse gas and a small, leak-prone molecule; its climate and integrity profile is less benign than its proponents imply, which matters wherever the gas-sector analogue is invoked.
- **For some assets, the honest answer is retirement.** Not every corridor has a second life. A framework that cannot conclude “retire this one” is not a decision tool; it is advocacy. Reserve-and-retire must remain a genuine, and sometimes the correct, output.

7. A Decision Framework: Repurpose, Reserve, or Retire

The transferable contribution of this analysis is a method for classifying assets under molecular uncertainty, not a prediction about any single corridor. Four questions discriminate between the options (Exhibit 5):

EXHIBIT 5

Repurpose, reserve, or retire — the decision in one pass



Source: author's analysis; underlying figures per Appendix A.

- **Demand certainty.** How credible, and how near, is committed demand for each alternative use (renewable liquids, CO_2, or data)? The operational test is stackability rather than sentiment: can an actual instrument stack of auctioned premiums, regulated accounts, and subsidy-backed anchor off-takers be assembled along this route today?

- **Conversion cost and reversibility.** What does each conversion cost, and how reversible is it? Reversible, low-cost moves preserve optionality; irreversible, high-cost moves consume it and need far more demand certainty to justify. Partner-carried structures, in which the corridor contributes easement and installed assets while specialists bear the build and market risk, are the reversible form of digital conversion.
- **Strategic and security value.** Does the corridor carry security value (supply diversification, sovereignty) that justifies retention beyond its commercial return?
- **Digital and cross-cutting optionality.** Does the right-of-way have molecule-neutral value (fibre, coastal cooling) that underwrites the asset independent of what flows in the steel?

Scoring an asset against these yields one of three dispositions. **Repurpose** where demand certainty is rising and conversion is affordable and reversible: sequence commitments in stages rather than betting the asset on a single molecular future, and co-design across liquids, CO_2, and digital so that no one path is stranded. **Reserve** where the future is genuinely uncertain: mothball with reactivation capability and monetise the molecule-neutral layers (fibre, land, interconnection) in the meantime. **Retire** where no alternative use is credible and security value is absent, in an orderly, staged manner that recovers value and avoids a disorderly write-off.

The framework's discipline is that it forces the question to be asked asset by asset, and answered with a sequence of staged, reversible commitments rather than a single irreversible bet. That is how real options are managed under deep uncertainty.

8. Conclusion

Europe's midstream corridors are neither doomed liabilities nor trivially convertible assets. They are irreplaceable rights-of-way whose value depends on how their optionality is allocated across an uncertain set of energy and non-energy futures. Mispricing that option in either direction is among the more consequential capital-allocation errors of the coming decade: write the corridor off, and a society discards infrastructure it cannot rebuild; assume easy conversion, and it over-invests against demand that may never arrive.

What this paper adds to that familiar symmetry is a diagnosis of where the decision actually gets made. The engineering is, for most purposes, solved. The demand-risk deadlock, long treated as the reason nothing moves, has been broken repeatedly since 2023 — but only by public balance sheets writing options that private counterparties cannot, and only inside national borders. The corridor's defining problem is therefore neither metallurgy nor an unbreakable chicken-and-egg; it is that every existing underwriting instrument stops at a frontier the corridor crosses. Until a corridor-scale instrument exists (and none does), the operator's scarce capability is instrument-stacking: sequencing auctioned premiums, regulated amortisation accounts, and subsidy-backed anchor off-takers into a single bankable cross-border structure, while monetising the molecule-neutral layers of the right-of-way through partner-carried, reversible commitments. The corridor holder is, in effect, the system integrator of other people's balance sheets.

The sharper vocabulary this paper argues for is simple to state and demanding to apply. The pipe is replaceable; the corridor is not. The question is not whether the steel can carry a new molecule but how to deploy an irreplaceable corridor across the futures that might arrive: crude, liquids, carbon, data, or dignified retirement. Where no instrument stack can be assembled, the answer is to hear that as a price rather than a failure, and to reserve or retire with the same discipline one would bring to converting. That is a portfolio problem, owned by whoever holds the corridor. It will be decided, well or badly, in the next decade. The open policy question is whether Europe gives its corridor holders a cross-border instrument to decide it with.

Appendix A. Source Map

Every factual claim in this paper draws on publicly available sources. This appendix documents that provenance. The paper is written generically and identifies no specific operator; the archetype is illustrative and draws on no non-public information.

Factual claim (public)	Public source
EU climate neutrality by 2050 codified in binding law	Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 ('European Climate Law')
Global oil demand plateaus around 2030 under stated policies	IEA World Energy Outlook, stated-policies scenario
Hydrogen is an indirect greenhouse gas (GWP_{100} ≈ 11–12); small, leak-prone molecule	Sand et al. (2023), Communications Earth & Environment; UK Government hydrogen GWP assessment (2022)
European Hydrogen Backbone: ≈ 53,000 km by 2040, ≈ 60% repurposed / 40% new, €80–143 bn (2022 estimate)	European Hydrogen Backbone initiative (ehb.eu), April 2022 report and press release
Hydrogen pipeline transport ≈ €0.11–0.21 / kg per 1,000 km; embrittlement manageable with pressure control	European Hydrogen Backbone reports; operator statements
Fibre-optic cable threaded through decommissioned petroleum pipelines from 1985; grew into the fourth-largest US long-distance network; network sold in 1995	Williams Companies / WilTel corporate history; Williams Companies Form 8-K announcing the $2.5 bn sale to LDDS (1995)
Peer-pipeline fibre: ~878 km installed with the gas pipeline, commercialised via JV with a fibre operator; new 106 km subsea Adriatic crossing; 4,500 km Marseille–Istanbul backbone; ~12-month design-to-service (≈ half typical time); cut rate ≈ 0.126 per 1,000 km-year vs ≈ 1 for road-buried cable (operator figures)	EXA Infrastructure / Trans Adriatic Pipeline AG — Trans Adriatic Express press releases, system brochure and profile (exainfra.net; submarinenetworks.com; Telecompaper)
Global network traffic ≈ 22–25% CAGR 2022–2030 (up to 32% in a high-adoption scenario); AI inter-data-centre traffic a leading growth segment in later editions	Nokia Global Network Traffic 2030 report (Oct 2023); Nokia Global Network Traffic report (2025 edition)
Adriatic submarine-cable corridor toward Central Europe	Sparkle 'GreenMed' (2023); Italian Foreign Ministry release
Marseille = leading European landing hub (17 cable landings); geography shifting toward more direct Central-European routes	Orange (2025); Medusa cable system materials
Mediterranean cable end-of-life and capacity pressure toward 2030	Medusa Submarine Cable System (medusascs.com)
Data-centre freshwater use and interest in seawater / coastal cooling	Public reporting on data-centre water consumption
Seawater-cooled 1.2 GW data campus co-located with subsea-cable landings (EllaLink et al.) at an industrial port; cooling via the repurposed intake of a decommissioned coal-fired power plant; design WUE 0, PUE 1.1	Start Campus SINES DC public materials and press releases; EllaLink; trade press (Data Center Dynamics; Jacobs project profile)

Factual claim (public)	Public source
Cross-border hydrogen pipeline (≈ €3 bn; supply chain 'tens of billions') abandoned Sept 2024 for lack of long-term offtake agreements	Equinor / RWE — Reuters, 20 Sept 2024; company statements
CO_2 pipeline project in southern England discontinued Oct 2024 citing absent policy and market conditions	ExxonMobil Solent CO_2 Pipeline Project statement; trade press
European Hydrogen Bank: pilot (Nov 2023–Feb 2024) ≈ €720 m to 7 projects at €0.37–0.48/kg; 2nd round 15 winners of which 6 signed (€270.6 m, Jan 2026); 3rd round (results May 2026) €1.09 bn to 9 projects at €0.44–3.49/kg; national top-ups via Auctions-as-a-Service	European Commission (energy.ec.europa.eu); CINEA; Commission press release IP/26/1004
H2Global pilot: 10-year purchase agreement, renewable ammonia €1,000/t delivered (€811/t net), ≤ 397 kt to 2033, max €397 m; €4.43 bn German funding commitment; eSAF lot ended without award	H2Global Stiftung / Hintco results publications; BMWK; S&P Global Commodity Insights
German hydrogen core network: 9,040 km, ≈ 60% repurposed; BNetzA approval 22 Oct 2024; WANDA intertemporal cost-allocation determination; ramp-up tariff €25/kWh/h/a; KfW €24 bn facility with federal guarantee; operator co-payment up to 24% if account unbalanced by 2055	Bundesnetzagentur press releases and determinations; BMWE Hydrogen Core Network FAQ; KfW
UK Track-1 CCUS: £21.7 bn over 25 years (Oct 2024); Transport & Storage Regulatory Investment (TRI) economic-licence model with last-resort revenue support; East Coast Cluster T&S and Net Zero Teesside financial close Dec 2024	DESNZ / GOV.UK CCUS collection; UK Parliament Public Accounts Committee report; Ofgem
Dutch CO_2 flagship: four emitters on 15-year T&S contracts (Dec 2021); FID Oct 2023 at €1.3 bn; 2.5 Mt/yr; onshore line sized for 10 Mt; PCI status + €102 m CEF; operations not before H2 2027; emitter capture economics underwritten by the SDE++ scheme	Porthos consortium / Port of Rotterdam / EBN; European Commission PCI list; RVO (SDE++)
Norwegian model: majority state funding of first phase; injection from 2025; cross-border CO_2 contracts with emitters in NL, DK, SE	Northern Lights JV / Equinor; Norwegian Ministry of Energy (Longship)
Cross-border CO_2 shipment framework: 2009 London Protocol export amendment; 2019 resolution on provisional application; bilateral agreements	International Maritime Organization; national bilateral agreements (e.g., Norway–Netherlands)
EU Hydrogen and Decarbonised Gas Market Package: inter-temporal cost allocation with optional state guarantee, and conditional financial transfers between regulated services (Art. 5); PCI eligibility for H_2/CO_2 networks	Directive (EU) 2024/1788; Regulation (EU) 2024/1789, Article 5; TEN-E Regulation (EU) 2022/869
German Federal Constitutional Court judgment of 15 Nov 2023 (2 BvF 1/22): reallocation of €60 bn in emergency credit authorisations to the Climate and Transformation Fund declared void	Bundesverfassungsgericht press release and judgment; contemporaneous coverage

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